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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, members of the international community have debated
whether World Trade Organization (WTO) Members can fulfill their obligations
under the international Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)' while using provisions of the Agreement to
address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. One provision is TRIPS Article 31(b), the
subject of this Note.
TRIPS Article 31 covers compulsory licenses which, when used, remove a
WTO Member from its general obligation to recognize exclusive patent rights
before a patent period has expired.2 Article 31 contains a number of requirements
a Member must still meet, including the Article 31(b) requirement that "prior to
such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time."3 Article 31(b) also
provides, however, "[tihis requirement may be waived by a Member in the case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency ... "
The issue is whether the provision, "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency," encompasses a public health emergency such as the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. If so, then a WTO Member, through legislation, could set
up a mechanism for producing pharmaceuticals and distributing them at a lower
cost, without having to undergo difficult negotiations with pharmaceutical
companies for a "reasonable" period of time.
This issue is likely to come before a WTO panel. The purpose of this Note
is to provide some background information about the following the HIV/AIDS
epidemic-including some of the security and economic concerns it raises; the
evolution of the debate-including some discussion of the relationship between
free trade and intellectual property protection; and the World Trade Organization-its dispute settlement mechanism, objectives, and potential impact on the
global community. In addition, the Note will address how a WTO panel could

' Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter

TRIPS].
2 TRIPS, sapra note 1, 33 I.L.M. at 95-96.

Id at 95.
4Id
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eventually interpret Article 31(b)'s waiver provision to conclude it does not
encompass a public health emergency such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HIV/AIDS

The incidence of disease, particularly in developing countries, is either5
unreported or under-reported due in part to stigmas attached to many diseases.
Countries are reluctant to reveal the information for fear it will reduce profit
generated from trade, tourism, etc.6 Nonetheless, the figures are astounding.
At the end of 2000, approximately 31.6 million people worldwide were
infected with HIV, 90% of whom live in developing countries.' Seventy-five
percent of infected individuals are in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventy percent of the
four million new infections worldwide in 1998 occurred in this region. 9 Eastern
and southern African countries have been affected the most, with 10% to 26%
of adults infected with HIV. The disease, however, is also rapidly spreading
through India, Russia, China, and other parts of Asia. 1 By 2010, projections
indicate Asia and the Pacific region could exceed Africa in the number of
infections. 2 Latin America is the third hardest hit region. 3
Four-fifths of all HIV-related deaths (1.8-2 million out of 2.3 million) in 1998
were in sub-Saharan Africa. 4 These figures exceed the 1996 joint World
Bank/World Health Organization (WHO) model's projections that deaths would
peak at 1.7 million in 20065 11.5 million out of 13.9 million cumulative AIDS
even though the region contains only
deaths have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa,
16
about a tenth of the world population.

5 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE GLOBAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREAT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 18 (2000), at

http://www.cia.gov/nic/graphics/infectiousdiseases.pdf.
6 Id

7 G.A. Res. 5-26/2, U.N. GAOR, 26th Special Sess., 8th plen. Mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/526/2 (2001), avaibk at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/docs/ress262.pdf.
8 Id
9 NATL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, sma note 5, at 27.
to Id
" Id at

15.

12Id at 7.

13id at 30.
14NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, s$fira note 5, at 27.
's I at 43.
16Id at 27.
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The National Intelligence Council (NIC) projects 41.6 million children in
twenty-seven countries (nineteen of which are in sub-Saharan Africa) will lose one
or both parents to AIDS by 2010.17 Some of these countries "will face a
demographic upheaval as HIV/AIDS and associated diseases reduce human life
expectancy by as much as 30 years and kill as many as a quarter of their
populations over a decade or less, producing a huge orphan cohort.""8
In June of 2001, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly recognized in its
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS that the HIV/AIDS crisis in subSaharan Africa threatens, among other things, development and political
stability.19
H1V/AIDS threatens development in part because the economic burden is so
substantial. According to the Global AIDS Policy Coalition at Harvard
University, the total direct and indirect costs of AIDS are estimated to have
exceeded $500 billion by 2000.' Infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS and
malaria, impact productivity, profitability, and foreign investment."
According to recent studies, this impact could be reflected in a 20% or more
reduction in GDP by 2010 in some sub-Saharan countries.' The NIC reports
"[a] senior World Bank official considers AIDS to be the single biggest threat to
economic development in sub-Saharan Africa."' In Zimbabwe, more than half
the health budget is already spent on treating AIDS.24 In Kenya, 50% of health
spending will go to AIDS by 2005.25 In South Africa, the rate is projected to be
35% to 84% by 2005.'

AIDS-related costs to African firms may include absenteeism, productivity
declines, health and insurance payments, and recruitment and training.7 There
is a high rate of loss to AIDS of middle and upper-level managers and their
replacements.' In addition, a large number of skilled workers in mining and
other important sectors are dying of AIDS." According to the NIC, one study

'

Id at 50.

Id at 9-10.
,9 G.A. Res. 5-26/2, .rranote 7, at 2.
IS

20 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 47-48.
21 Id at 9.

2 Id
23

Id at 46.

24 Id
2s

at 49.

NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 49.

26id

Id at 47.
28 id
29 Id
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projects that in South Africa, benefit costs will nearly triple to 19% of salaries
from 1995 to 2005, which will substantially affect corporate profits.'
Besides threatening development, HIV/AIDS could create political instability,
even in democratic nations. 31 The large orphan population could contribute to
this instability, considering various radical and/or political groups might find
problematic regions to be good grounds for recruitment: "the pervasive child
soldier phenomenon may be one example."32 The UN Security Council, at its
4172nd meeting in July 2000, passed Resolution 1308, recognizing the growing
impact of HIV/AIDS on social instability. 3 If it remains unchecked, the
pandemic could pose a security risk.'
One study suggests infant mortality correlates strongly with political instability,
which the study defined as: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides, and
disruptive regime transitions. 35 Because HIV/AIDS not only affects the rural and
lower income populations, but also the middle class and the political and military
elite, tensions between the various groups could produce a struggle for control of
limited state resources.
HI-V/AIDS is already prevalent in some militaries, predominantly in subSaharan Africa, with infection rates that range from 10% to 60%. 37 The NIC
projects "[t]he greatest impact will be among hard-to-replace officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with specialized skills. ' M A high rate of

turnover in military leadership means international peacekeeping efforts could be
negatively impacted and groups in military-dominated states could seize
39
opportunities to launch military coups.
The NIC also reports although sub-Saharan military capabilities will be
impacted the most, particularly those with a modest level of modernization in
weapons systems and platforms, in the future, HIV/AIDS could also severely
impact the capabilities of more modernized militaries in former Soviet Union
states, China, and certain rogue states with large armies and modem weapons
arsenals.' The NIC even noted the relevance of intellectual property disputes:

30 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 5, at
31 Id at 50.

47.

32 Id

S.C. Res. 1308, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4172nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (2000).
at 2.
35 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, s$ranote 5, at 51-52.
6 Id at 50.
31 Id at 52.
1

34 Id

38 id

39Id
40 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, mpra note

5, at 52.
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A growing controversy ... will be over drug-related intellectual
property rights, in which developing countries will press for more
and cheaper drugs from developed country pharmaceutical firms
and resort to producing their own generic brands if they are
rebuffed. States will remain concerned, as well, about the growing
biological warfare threat from rogue states and terrorist groups.4'
As these comments indicate, developing countries are concerned about HIVinfected individuals not getting adequate medical treatment. In sub-Saharan
Africa and China, "80 percent of the rural population no longer has subsidized
health care ....Under this scenario access to essential drugs and basic medical
care in these regions will remain poor or deteriorate.... ,42Even in South Africa,
a relatively prosperous country, only about 1 percent of HIV/AIDS-infected
43
individuals are receiving the multi-drug treatment.
According to the organization, Mdecins Sans Frontires, 95% of HIVinfected individuals worldwide cannot afford the multi-drug regimines now
believed to be essential to the treatment of the disease.' The current average
price of the "cocktail" treatment in the United States is approximately $10,000 to
$15,000 per patient per year.4 In many developing nations, the prices are
significantly less, but even prices that have been negotiated are still too costly for
the average infected individual.'
As mentioned before, the UN General Assembly recently adopted a
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.'7 Many groups, including Midecins
Sans Frondi&res, were optimistic about the Declaration." There are several
provisions that foreshadow further discussions relating to treatment access and

41 Id
42 Id

at 53.
at 42.

Id at 49.
Sans Frontiires,Backgrundlnforaaatio onHIV/AIDS (Sept 2001), athttp://www.
accessmed-msf.org/upload/ReportsandPublications/19920011113473/Aids/o20BG(1).pdf.
"Mdecins

5

Id

' KaisemetworkIorg, Dail HIV/AIDS Repot. DrwgAccss--FwHIV.PoiiveAfricans Rewiing
Treatment Two Years After U.N. Pb to Impmr Access (Mar. 29, 2002), ava'labb at http://www.
kaisemetworkorg/dailyreports/rep-index.cfm?hint= 1&DR.ID=10323 ("Although some of the
drugs' prices are only one-sixteenth the cost of the same drugs in the United States, they are still too
expensive for many Africans, who on average have incomes of less than one dollar per day.")
(citation omitted).
41GA. Res. 5-26/2, supra note 7.
" Midecins Sans Frontires, MSF Welcomes UN's Ckar Commitmentto AIDS Treatment (June 27,
2001), at http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?artideid=7A83C8D6-20AS-459E-936D754AF
8492FCF.
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intellectual property rights.49 The resolution reinforces the importance of finding
effective solutions consistent with international law.'
B. EVOLUTION OF THE DEBATE

After a 1988 study by the United States International Trade Commission
concluded U.S. companies were losing billions in international sales due to foreign
competitors copying/stealing intellectual property, the research pharmaceutical
industry took the lead in promoting strong international intellectual property
protection.51 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) led this
effort as " 'one of the best organized, sufficiently funded, and powerful
associations . ... "'52 PMA was and has been successful in its lobbying efforts in

part because its members include former government officials from Commerce
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).s3
The pharmaceutical industry began to frame the issue of the lack of intellectual
property protection in certain countries as criminal, using the term "piracy" to
gain support in Congress and from the public' The media and government
criticized foreign governments for their lack of protection." President Reagan,
convinced that the intellectual property of U.S. corporations was vulnerable,
"pledged new efforts to protect intellectual property rights, stating that '[w]hen
governments permit counterfeiting or copying of American products, it is stealing
our future and it is no longer free trade.' ,56
To elaborate on this point, in countries that offer only limited or no
intellectual property protection and have the infrastructure to produce
pharmaceuticals, manufacturers have the advantage of avoiding research and
development costs.5 7 They can then sell these "pirated" products for less money

49 See ageftral#~id
50

Id

5' Christopher S. Harrison, Protemion of Pharmaceuticasas Foreign Poif: The Canada-U.S. Trade
Agreement and Bill C-22 Versu the NorthAmeianFree Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C.J. INT'L
LAw & COM. REG. 457,498 (2001).
s2 Id at 499 (quoting Paul C.B. Liu, Taiwan: U.S. Indu#sy's Influence of Intelctual Propet
Negotiations and Sfpeda301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 106-07 (1994)).
"' Id at 500. PMA hired Gerald Mossinghoff, former Assistant Commerce Secretary and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, as its President, and Harvey E. Bale,Jr., who worked for
twelve years for the USTR office.
'4 Id at 495-96.
55 Id at 496.
56 Harrison, supranote 51, at 496-97 (quoting Bruce Stokes, IntelletudalPirag Captures the Attention
of the President and Congress, NAT'LJ., Feb. 22, 1986, at 443).
57 See id at 466-67 (stating that in countries that do not protect intellectual property,
manufacturers can produce patented pharmaceuticals without additional research and development
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than the creators of the pharmaceutical. 5' Without adequate protection, "creators
can no longer recover the cost of their investment in research and development,
resulting in lower production, fewer trading opportunities, and higher costs to the
consumer."59 One argument is that permitting "piracy" distorts trade like
affirmative governmental regulation:
As exporters or investors are reluctant to introduce products or
transfer technology containing key intellectual property for fear that
such property will be pirated, piracy becomes a barrier to trade. To
the extent that such a trade barrier discourages free trade, it
contributes to a decline in competitiveness in the affected
60
countries.
In light of this view, the 1984 revisions to section 301 of the Trade Act of

1974 (section 301)6 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
(Omnibus Trade Act)62 were huge successes for the pharmaceutical industry.
Initially, the 1974 legislation was enacted to enforce GATT and treaty conferred
trade rights.3 Section 301 expanded the scope of "unreasonable trade practices"
and it "authorized the USTR to demand unrequited trade concessions from
America's trading partners."" The Omnibus Trade Act amended section 301 and
defined "as unreasonable, '[a]n act, policy, or practice... while not necessarily in
violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United
States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable.' ,,6s
Within the Omnibus Trade Act is Special 301, an intellectual property-specific
measure aimed at addressing inadequate or ineffective intellectual property
protection." Special 301 is "based on the assumption that the United States could
use threats and negotiation to obtain meaningful changes in the intellectual
property regimes of its trading partners.' 67

costs).

s Id at 467.
s Marshall A. Leaffer, Proteting United Stes Iatelkt al Pnrvpt Abroad Toward a Now
Multilateralism,76 IowA L. REV. 273, 277 (1991).
60 Harrison, supra note 51, at 481.
6 Id at 500. Section 301 was called the "H-bomb of trade policy" by one USTR ambassador.
Id
6 Id at 501.
Harrison calls the Omnibus Trade Act the "thermonuclear bomb" of foreign
economic policy. Id
3 Id at 500.
64 id

's Id at 502 (quoting Omnibus Trade Act, S 1301, 102 Stat. 1164, 1167 (1988)).
66 Id

67 Id (quotingJohn Gero & Kathleen Lannan, TradeandInovaion: Uxilaimettm v. Mudtilatmr,
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Special 301 surfaces in the HIV/AIDS context when U.S. officials believe
countries have inadequate intellectual property protection of pharmaceuticals
(regardless of whether the legislation of certain countries is TRIPS-consistent)."
Special 301 requires the USTR to prepare a list of "priority" trading partners
considered to be the worst offenders of intellectual property rights, then negotiate
with these "priority" countries under the threat of sanctions.69 There are other
70
lists for countries whose violations are not as severe.
One contributing factor for why Special 301 is so effective is that it delegates
the monitoring responsibility to the industry. 71 Special 301 allows private interests
(including intellectual property industry members) to monitor trading partners'
intellectual property regimes and submit complaints to the USTR if there are any
potential violations. 2 Private industry then continues to supplement further
information to the USTR during the review process." The USTR, using this
information, then determines whether action should be taken.74
Section 301 and Special 301 have been effective in pressuring countries to
adopt stronger intellectual property regimes. The U.S. has threatened unilateral
trade sanctions under section 301 against Brazil for its inadequate pharmaceutical
intellectual property protection." In addition, using Special 301, the USTR has
placed several countries on "watch lists," again using trade sanctions as a threat
for compliance. Countries with a substantial percentage of exports going to the
United States have little room to negotiate.76 They may also find it problematic
to bring the issue before the WTO. 7' Two examples are South Africa and
Thailand.

21 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 81, 84 (1995)).
See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (referring to South Africa and Thailand).
6 Judy Rein, IntrnationalGovenanmc Throxgb Trade Agreementr: Patent Protectionfor Essential
Medicines, 21 Nw. J. INTL. L & Bus. 379, 399 (2001).
70 Harrison, s .ra note 51, at 503. There are four lists on which countries can be classified. Id
For a more detailed description of the procedure for classifying countries for placement on different
watch lists, see id at 503-04.
" See id at 504 (describing how private interests can to submit complaints to the USTR).
72 Id

" Id at 505.
74 Jj

73Rein, smpra note 69, at 393.
76 Id

7 A WTO panel has already heard a case involving Sections 301 to 310 and found them to be
consistent with WTO obligations. United States-Sections 301 to 310 of the Trade Act of 1974Report of the Panel, Symbol WT/DS1 52/R, athttp://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.usp (Dec. 22,
1999). In addition, developing countries are not on equal footing in the WTO. See infranotes 15153 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between developed and developing countries).
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In 1998 and 1999, the USTR placed South Africa on a watch list in response
to the enactment of South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Act
(Medicines Act)."8 The USTR was concerned with "the Medicines Act's 'ill
defined authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorize parallel imports and
potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights."'7 9 Focusing on the parallel imports
provision in the Medicines Act as being inconsistent with TRIPS, the United
States negotiated with South Africa in hopes. it would achieve the " 'repeal,
termination or withdrawal' of Article 15C of the Medicines Act."' The United
States suspended four items from receiving preferential tariff treatment under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).81

In addition, Thailand has been on the "priority" watch list for its limited
protection of intellectual property ights.82 AIDS activists tried to persuade the
Thai Public Health Minister to grant a compulsory license for'the drug didanosine
(ddi), which would have been the first one issued under Article 31 of TRIPS, but
pressure from the United States was too great.' 3 Thailand's exports to the United
States make up about one fourth of its total exports."
Consumer rights groups" and organized members of the medical profession"
have covered the compulsory licensing debate extensively in an effort to educate
the general public. HIV/AIDS and human rights activists have directed criticism
78Rein, supra note 69, at 401. For a detailed description of the Medicines Act and the resulting
United States pressure on South Africa to change this legislation, see Duane Nash, Soarb Afica's
Mediwnes andRelated Substances ControlAmendmentAt of 1997,15 BERKELEY TECH. LJ.485 (2000).
79Rein, spra note 69, at 401 (quoting Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR
AnnoxncesResultsofSpeda1301 AnnualRoview(Apr. 30,1999), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1 999/
04/99-41.html).
80Rein, supra note 69, at 401. See U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal,
Termination or Withdrawal of Article 15(C) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances
Act of 1965 (Feb. 5,1999), availabkat http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html.
See also S 15C of Medicines and Related Substances Control Act [Medicines Act) of 1965 (as
amended in 1997), JRSA 1997 vol. 3 at 1-63, availbk at http://www.polity.org.22/govdocs/
legislation/1997/act90.pdf
81Rein, supra note 69, at 401.
'2Id at 402-03.
83Id at 402.
84 I

'sSee general# Consumer Project on Technology, Abot the Consumer Project on Technowg, at
http://www.cptech.org/abouthtml (last revised on Feb. 22, 2001) (the Consumer Project on
Technology (CPTech) was started by Ralph Nader in 1995). "[CPTech'sl work is documented
extensively on the CPT web page. Currently [CPTech] is focusing on intellectual property rights,
and health care, electronic commerce (very broadly defined) and competition policy... James Love
is the Director. Mike Palmedo works mostly on access to medicines." Id
See M~decins sans Fronti&s, Camaign for Acrs to Essential Medeanes, at http://www.
accessmed-msf.org/upload/reportsandpublicationsl9920011113473/Aids%2OBG(l).pdf (lastvisited
Aug. 25, 2001).
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predominantly at the office of the USTR, the pharmaceutical industry, and the
WTO, in part because they believe strong international intellectual protection
policies have prevented WTO Members from enacting or utilizing legislation that
might give infected individuals better access to the costly but effective multi-drug
regimens.
After South Africa made the USTR watch list in 1998 and 1999,
[ain explosion of publicity generated by AIDS activists in the
United States ensued, and the U.S. government backed off its more
aggressive stance. 8"... The United States recognized South Africa's
urgent need for more affordable health care in the context of the
AIDS epidemic, and it pledged an end to the issue and restoration
of GSP privileges in exchange for assurances that in implementing
its health policy, South Africa would comply with TRIPS."
In addition, in May 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order
declaring that the United States would not seek changes in patent laws in subSaharan African countries that promote access to HIV/AIDS drugs."9 President
Bush could overturn this executive order without Congressional approval, but he
has said he will not do it.*0 Though the executive order is limited to sub-Saharan
African countries, Thailand received similar assurances from the United States
with regard to its compulsory licensing laws."1 And even more recently, the USTR
announced the Administration's flexible approach in its dealings with Brazil.92
The Brazil press release suggests the policy is not limited to sub-Saharan African
countries. 93

's Rein, stra note 69, at 402 (citing Charles R. Babcock, AIDS Activistr Dog Gore a 2nd Day,
WASH. PosT,June 18,1999, atAl2. "Activists targeted campaigning Vice President Gore, who was
involved in negotiations through leadership of the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission." Id
at n.130).
"' Rein, sipra note 69, at 402. See aso Press Release, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, U.S.--South Africa Understanding on Intellectual Property (Sept. 17, 1999), at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/ 09/99-76.html.
"Anne-Marie Tabor, Recent Developments, AIDS Crsis, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 527
(2001) (referring to Exec. Order No. 13, 155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 12, 2000)).
90 Id

9"James T. Gathii, Construing Intdkctmal Propery Rights and Competition Polit ConistentI with
FauitatingAccess to Affordabk AIDS Drmgs to Law-End Consmers, 53 FLA. L REV. 727, 766 (2001).
92 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, UnitedStates andBrajlAgrre
to Use Newy Created Comltative Mechanism to Promote Cooperation on HIV/AIDS and Addss IFTO
Patent Dipute (June 25, 2001), at http://www.ust.gov/releases/2001/06/01-46.htm.
9 id
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An important point to note about this flexible approach is that most of these
official announcements include the condition that developing countries be
TRIPS-consistent in their legislation involving intellectual property rights.94
Defining what is TRIPS-consistent legislation falls within the WTO's
jusdiction. s
A WTO panel has not yet issued a report on the precise meaning of Article
31(b), but the opportunity to do so may come in the future. The United States
has already petitioned (though it eventually withdrew the petition) the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) against Brazil on a compulsory licensing
dispute.96 In addition, the recent Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 9' though not legally binding," issued at the Doha Ministerial
Conference in November 2001, may influence or compel some Members to test
the waters by enacting or utilizing controversial public health legislation. Until the
flexibility of the Declaration is solidified in an amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement, there is room for dispute among Members.
United States officials may currently be hesitant to bring another compulsory
licensing dispute before the WTO, either because the issue is too politically
controversial or because they are fearful of an unfavorable outcome. An
unfavorable outcome in this specific dispute would mean that TRIPS Article

Siad
In February, the Bush Administration stated the commitment of the United
States to a flexible approach that is sensitive to health crises and also protective

of intellectual property rights. Under this policy, the Administration has
informed WTO Members that as they take steps to address major health crises,
such as the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, the United

States would raise no objection if Members availed themselves of the flexibility
afforded by the WTO TRIPS Agreement.
Id See also Gathii, supra note 91, at 766 (dealing with Thailand's health crisis).
's Seegemra/5'World Trade Organization, TRIPS Material on the WTO Website, athttp://www.

wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/trips-e.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (discussing various
aspects of the TRIPS agreement).
" Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, spra note 92.
97Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
adopted on Nov. 14, 2001,WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20,2001), athttp://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/minist.e/min01e/mindecLtrips-e.htm (providingin part: "Each member has the right

to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it
being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency"). Id
"Basically there are five different techniques for making decisions or formulating new or
amended rules of trade policy in the WTO Charter- decisions on various matters, 'interpretations,'
waivers, amendments to the agreements, and finally, negotiation of new agreements." JohnJackson
et al.,

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIALS AND

TEXT (3d ed. 1995).
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31(b) language encompasses the HIV/AIDS public health emergency as a national
emergency. Other trading partners of the United States could enact similar
legislation and use the unfavorable ruling as persuasive authority in future
disputes. Nevertheless, the fear of an unfavorable ruling is not likely to last if
patent-holders see intellectual property protection weakening and pressure the
government to take action before the WTO.
C. DISPUTE SETrLEMENT UNDER THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (the Understanding on Dispute Settlement or DSU)
established "an integrated, rules-based dispute settlement process with a right of
appellate review."" Only Member states can initiate complaints and intervene in
proceedings'00 and the DSU is the only mechanism available for resolving disputes
unless parties agree otherwise.'
The DSU assures "that all panel or Appellate
Body reports will be adopted expeditiously and without modification."'" 0
The DSU also prohibits Members from acting unilaterally on the following
issues: "(1) whether an Uruguay Round agreement has been violated, (2) whether
another member has failed to implement a DSB recommendation within a
reasonable period of time, or (3) whether the level of suspension of concessions
is appropriate."' 0 3 The purpose of this commitment is to ensure that
government-sanctioned barriers do not impede trade."
After a country petitions the WTO to settle a dispute, the Member states
involved in the dispute undergo negotiations.'
If these discussions are not
fruitful, the parties decide the composition of the panel of experts to consider the
6
case.

'

10

Kennedy, infra note 101, at 45.

Jacqueline Peel, Giing the Pubkc a Voice in the Protection ofthe GlobalEnvironment: Avenes for
ParticipationIy NGOs in Dipste Resolution at t&eEuropean Comt ofJuAtire and Wodd Trade O1auixation,
12 CoLo.J. INT'L ENVTL L & POLY 47, 62 (2001).
101 Kevin C. Kennedy, Trade and the Environment: Imphcations for Global Governance: Wbhy
Mutilaterasm Mattm in Resohding Trade-EnvironmentDisputes, 7 WIDENER L SYMP.J. 31,47 (2001); see
also World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future-Disputes-Overview, at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto-e/whais-e/tif-e/displ-e.htm (stating that "[tlhe Dispute Settlement Body
has the sole authority to establish 'panels' of experts to consider the case, and to accept or reject the
panels' findings or the results of an appeal").
102 Id at 45.
103 Kennedy, supra note 101, at 47.
104 Id at 47.
100

'05World Trade Organization, supra note 101.
06 Kim Van der Borght, Critical Essay, The Review ofthe ITO Undertandngon Dispete Settltment,
Some Relftions on the Crt'nt Debate, 14 Am.U. INT'L L. REV. 1223, 1238 (1999).
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Panels only base findings on cited agreements, 7 and they only address claims
and issues necessary to reach a decision."8 They can accept amicus briefs, though
they are not required to do so." 9 One writer suggests that when amicus briefs are
attached to a party's submission, the information appears to be "treated as part
of the government's materials for purposes of accepting the information and
having the opportunity to respond to it.""' The WTO's General Council, acting
as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) under the DSU, 1 ' then accepts or rejects
a panel's conclusion.' Rejection, however, must be by consensus, making panel
decisions virtually impossible to overturn." 3 After a ruling of the DSB, both sides
can appeal." 4
Three members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body hear the
appeal." Members of the Appellate Body, like panels, can only base findings on
cited agreements," 6 but can substitute a panel decision with a de novo decision
of their own."7 After the Appellate Body gives a report, the DSB again decides
whether to accept or reject it."' Like panel reports, Appellate Body reports can
only be rejected by a consensus of the DSB.""
In this system, panel and Appellate Body reports are not judgments; they are
legal advice given to the DSB, which makes the actual decision." The adoption
21
of reports, however, is "quasi-automatic," due to DSB's voting system.'
Therefore, WTO dispute settlement "in practice... functions as a judicial system
of settling international disputes.... The direction taken by the WTO system has

'07 World Trade Organization, sxra note 101.
108 Van der Borght, sxra note 106, at 1243.
'0 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, IfI. InstitutionalConcerns of an ExpandedTrade Regime: Where ShoMd
Global Soial and fgmatoi Poeig Be Made? Unfiiendl A'ion The Amcux Brief Battle at the WFTO, 7
WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 87, 98 (2001).
110 Id at 98.
t..Kennedy, spra note 101, at 45.

World Trade Organization, s"ranote 101.
Id The winning party is unlikely to reject a favorable report, thus making consensus
impossible.
112

113

114

Id

"s Id Each Appellate Body member has a four-year term.
116 id
117

Van der Borght, spra note 106, at 1243.

118World Trade Organization, mpra note 101.
119 Peel, supranote 100, at 63.
120 Kim Van der Borght, The Hague, Boston: K&wer Law International1999, 94 AM.J. INT'L L 427,
429-30 (2000) (reviewing DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MARVROIDiS, DISPUTE SETnEMENT IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1999)). The Hague, Boston: Klwerlaw Internatiow 1999, 94
AM. J. INT'L L 427, 429-30 (2000).
121 Id
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set it firmnly
on route to becoming recognized de facto as an international
22
court .... "'

D. COMMENTS ON THE WTO

Many people characterize the WTO as a secretive and powerful organization,
which is isolated from non-governmental influence, and which limits state
sovereignty. To some extent, these descriptions are accurate. Hearings are
private; governments that petition the DSB do not have to make public their full
submissions;1' 2 and the WTO only recently began publishing certain materials. 4
Its panels and Appellate Body are not required to consider amicus briefs
presented by non-governmental organizations.'
And finally, the organization
has a highly effective, enforceable dispute settlement mechanism that prohibits
12 6
states from acting unilaterally.
Probably the most important characteristic of the WTO, however, is that its
primary aim is to facilitate trade liberalization. 27 The DSU was primarily designed
to promote that goal, not other social policies such as development, environment,
security, and labor standards." Though many critics argue the WTO is an
isolated organization that acts against the important policy objectives of its
Member states, the fact that the WTO favors free trade objectives over other
social policy objectives may be a reflkcion of the national interests of its Member
states.'" For example, the United States has imposed import bans on certain
products based on environmental concerns, actions other countries then
challenged in the WTO. °
When it came to calls for amending intellectual property rules,
however, the United States and Europe switched stances on the
issue of WTO competence. Defending U.S. biotechnology,

ld at 430. See also Schneider, spra note 109, at 87 (suggesting that this "judicialization of the
I2

WTO and the growing importance of the dispute resolution mechanism mirror the worldwide trend
toward a more binding international dispute resolution").
'2 Peel, sapranote 100, at 62.
124 Kennedy, smra note 101, at 33, 54 (describing environmentalists' misgivings about the
WTO
and free trade). See also general# Schneider, spra note 109 (explaining the need for increased

transparency).

Peel, mpra
note 100, at 62.
'
Kennedy, supra note 101, at 48.
£27 Gregory Shaffer, The World Trade OrganitationUnderChalknge: Democa andthe Law and Poltics
of the WiTO' Treatment of Trade and EnwonentMatters, 25 HARv. ENVr1- L. REv. 1, 12 (2001).
'
Van der Borght, Apra note 120, at 427.
'2 Seegenera4 Shaffer, uvranote 127 (demonstrating Member states'positions on various issues).
£30 Shaffer, spra note 127, at 19-22.
125
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agribusiness and pharmaceutical interests, the United States
responded, "the WTO [is] not an environmental organization and
it lacked the competence to insert MEA [multilateral environmental
'3
agreement] goals in WTO Agreements." '
Regardless of who is responsible, the fact is panel and Appellate Body reports
can impact other important social policy goals. Environmental groups are
accurate when they assert panel and Appellate Body decisions have prohibited
unilateral measures aimed at curbing environmental degradation.'
It is unlikely,
however, the DSB will start rejecting petitions that involve significant non-trade
issues.
And "[it is more likely that the Appellate Body will increasingly use
language demonstrating its ability to properly balance these issues .... "34
In contrast to groups who hope for a less powerful WTO, some people see
the WTO regime as a mechanism for social change.'35 Because the system
imposes obligations on nation states and issues judgments that are binding, these
people see the WTO as an organization that could also enforce other social policy
36
objectives.'

Other people hoping just for better representation of a variety of interests
push for more non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement in the
system. 3 1 To some extent, it is already taking place. Panels and Appellate Body
members consider NGO briefs attached to government materials and can

consider them even if they are not attached.'
People who favor more NGO involvement believe these organizations will
39
ensure that "a broader set of values will be included in the WTO balancing act."'
The assumption, however, is that the objectives of NGOs vary from those
objectives of their respective governments." One writer reported:

13' Id at 34.
132
133

Kennedy, spra note 101, at 33-35.
Schneider, Us0ra note 109, at 93.

134 Id

'3s See, e.g., Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sancwons as an Eforement MechanimforBauc Hwman
Rights: A PromposalforAddiionto the World Trade Organitaion,11 AM. U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y 1, 4 (1996)
(proposing "the formation of an international human rights body within the WTO, charged with
overseeing the administration of a system for multilateral enforcement of human rights through
trade sanctions').
136 Id at 33-46.
137 Van der Borght, sipra note 106, at 1227.
3 See Van der Borght, smpra note 108, at 1243 and accompanying text; see Schneider, supranotes
109-10, at 98 and accompanying text.
139 Schneider, supra note 109, at 93.
140 Id
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[A] recent study of NGO involvement in rule-making found that
NGOs were far more likely to reflect their respective government's
position, rather than form alliances with other NGOs in order to
pressure governments. In other words, the idea that NGOs will
actually counterbalance their governments is not true and, therefore,
we might conclude that the presence of NGOs really does not add
anything of substance to decision-making in the WTO. "1
The other thing to consider in deciding whether to favor more NGO
involvement in the WTO dispute settlement system is that more involvement of
NGOs means more involvement of private industry actors, groups that are not
necessarily in favor of the social objectives of certain NGOs. 42 As one writer put
it, "[i]t is one thing to imagine that an environmental group might participate, it
is another thing to see well-funded industry groups and law firms participating in
the WVTO dispute resolution process." 43 Already in one case, the Appellate Body
allowed in amicus briefs from industry groups not attached to a government's
filings.-" Though the Appellate Body members did not use the briefs, they might
do so in the future."'

The same concerns expressed above are equally applicable in the HIV/AIDS
compulsory licensing dispute and could contribute to an unfavorable ruling for
developing countries. Like environmental objectives, social objectives aimed at
realizing human rights (tight to health) need more recognition by Member states
before WTO panels and the Appellate Body will consider them.1" There is'an
"enduring gap between human rights principles and the practice of states....
[D]espite the lip service paid to the notion of human rights, those rights are
routinely violated by governments all over the world-" '47 Significantly, one writer
suggests, "[s]o far the WTO dispute settlement scheme has been acceptable to
members because WTO panels have not dared to suggest that trade is a human
as opposed to a governmental right.... If the past is prologue, the WTO will
need to build a political consensus (at both national and international levels)

141 Id
142

Id at 100.

143Id
144 Schneider,

supra note 109, at 98 (discussing the British Steel case).

145Id

" Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link:-ImtitutionaConundrwnsof an ExpandedTrade Regime, 7-SPG
WIDENER L SYMP.J. 1, 14-15 (2001).
17 Richard B. Bilder & David P. Stewart, Book Review and Note Review Essay, U.S. Department
of State, Hunan Rights at the Afihtnniar, 95 AM. J. INT'L L 227, 227-28 (Jan. 2001).
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before it tries to build a viable trade constitution
that fully encompasses issues like
1 48
human rights and the environment."
Even if a WTO panel believes a human right to health exists and should be
considered in the balance, many people believe strong intellectual property
protection accomplishes public health objectives. Not only is there "broad
recognition of the role that patents and [Intellectual Property Rights] can play in
stimulating health-related research and development ('R&D')" but "the level of
protection conferred to inventions may influence foreign investment, technology
transfer, and research (especially joint research programs and research to address
local needs)." 49 This predominant view will also make panel members unwilling
or unable to call the right to have access to HIV/AIDS medications a human

right that trumps intellectual property rights.
In addition, it is unlikely the WTO will refrain from hearing the HIV/AIDS
compulsory licensing dispute. Though it is a politically controversial issue, the
fact is WTO Members must fulfill their obligations under TRIPS and resolve
disputes over its implementation in the WTO dispute settlement system.
Finally, a developing nation will not be on equal footing with the United States
in dispute settlement. Developing countries often do not have the financial
capabilities or expertise to effectively participate in the process; they cannot
effectively enforce WTO recommendations; and the process is likely to hurt them
more than an opposing developed nation." In addition, at this point, WTO
panels are not required to consider amicus briefs. Therefore, assistance in the
form of amicus briefs from specialized non-governmental health organizations
could have little impact.
15
Though some developing nations fared well in the environmental disputes,
in those disputes, unilateral actions by the United States were found inconsistent
with trade liberalization." 2 In contrast, United States officials will maintain that
the strongest intellectual property protection isnecessary to facilitate trade
liberalization in a TRIPS Article 31(b) dispute before a WTO panel. A developing
nation, without the financial resources and comparative expertise of trade
specialists, will be in the less favorable position of arguing for weaker intellectual
property protection. Given the WTO's primary goal to facilitate trade liberalization, a WTO panel is likely to find in favor of the United States, and conclude that
TRIPS Article 31(b) does not encompass public health emergencies.

148
149

Alvarez, .upra note 146, at 18-19.
Carlos Correa, Pubic Health and Patent D1gitk&on in Dw/opiu Countries, 3 TUL J. TEcH. &

INTELL PRop. 1, 3 (2001).
15o Van der Borght, sapranote 106, at 1226.
131 Kennedy, supra note 101, at 63.
152 See Shaffer, impra note 127, 19-22.
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III. ANALYSIS

The subject of this analysis is the compulsory license provision of TRIPS
Article 31, more specifically, Article 31(b). A successful compulsory license under
this provision would obligate a country to meet the other mandatory requirements
of Article 31 (discussed below), but allow the country to waive the requirement
of first attempting to obtain authorization from the patent right holder.' The
issue is whether TRIPS Article 31(b) encompasses a public health emergency such
as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
A. WTO PANEL AND APPELLA'IE BODY REVIEW

Decisions of the WTO DSB are not precedent for future decisions, but they
are binding on the parties involved, and are persuasive authority." Subsequent
panels often consider adopted panel reports under GAIT 1947 and 1994.' The
reports "create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore,
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute."' 6 The
Appellate Body has even said a panel could find guidance in the reasoning of a
relevant unadopted panel report."7 Therefore, in a TRIPS Article 31(b) dispute,
aWTO panel may consider past GATT decisions, its own recommendations, and
Appellate Body recommendations, adopted or unadopted, if it finds such
decisions to be relevant to the dispute.
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that panels and
the Appellate Body" 'clarify' the WTO Agreements, including GATT 1994...,
'in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law.' """ According to the Appellate Body, this requirement first refers to
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention).'59

'- TRIPS, spra note 1, 33 I.LM. at 95.

t54
Rein,ssranote 69, at 398 n.113. Note that previous panel decisions under GATT 1947 and
GATT 1994, as well as WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions, "do not constitute 'subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation' inthe sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention." Hannes L
Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, 'i7onsitationafitaioa"and Dipte Sealment in the WTO: National
Security as an Issme ofCompeten, 93 AM. J. INT-' L 424,431 n.38 (Apr. 1999).
"' Schloemann & Ohihoff, s"~r note 154, at 431 n.38.
156 i

tS Id
158 Id

15 Id
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According to Vienna Convention Article 31, a treaty is to be interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, in their context,
and in light of the treaty's object and purpose." Subsequent agreements between
the parties regarding the treaty's interpretation or application, subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty that establishes agreement regarding its interpretation, and any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties are also to be taken into account. 6
According to Article 32,
supplementary means of interpretation may be used to confirm the meaning
resulting from application of Article 31 or to determine the meaning when
interpretation yields ambiguous, obscure, absurd, or unreasonable results.'62
B. TRIPS, GENERALLY

The TRIPS Agreement created an international structure for the protection
of intellectual property rights. 6 3 It "sets forth detailed obligations in respect to
the protection of inventions, including
(1) to recognize patents for inventions in all fields of technology,
with limited exceptions; (2) not to discriminate with respect to the
availability or enjoyment of patent rights; (3) to grant patents rights
for at least twenty years from the date of application; (4) to limit the
scope of exceptions to patent rights and to grant compulsory
licenses only under certain conditions; and (5) to effectively enforce
patent rights. 6'
Because the Agreement does not establish uniform international law or legal
requirements, countries are permitted to design regulations that balance
intellectual property protection with other public policy objectives.6" How much
room they have to balance and still be TRIPS-consistent, however, is central to
TRIPS Article 31(b)'s construction.

0 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31.1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,341
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
161Id
162 Id
'63

Correa, supra note 149, at 3.

'6

Id at 3-4.

'6s

Id at 4.
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Under TRIPS, a term of patent protection is twenty years. The idea behind
compulsory licenses is that they offer some protection against abuses of power
that might occur during this time.'" Most compulsory licenses in the United

States have
been issued under antitrust laws to remedy anticompetitive
67
practices.'
TRIPS Article 31, though it does not use the term "compulsory license," sets
forth the provisions that must be followed should countries decide to grant
compulsory licenses. Provided are the most relevant provisions to this Note:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
including use by the government or third parties authorized by the
government, the following provisions shall be respected: ...
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the
proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in
the case of a nationalemergengy orother circumstancesof extreme utsengy or
in cases public non-commercial use. In situations of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably
practicable...
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the
purpose for which it was authorized...
(0 any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use...
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable.., to be terminated if
and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are
unlikely to recur...
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration....
Though many states agree the HIV/AIDS crisis meets the definition of
"national emergency,"169 "there is no firmly entrenched concept of 'emergency'

166 Id

67 Id

at 6.
at 44 n.177.

'"TRIPS, supranote 1, 33 I.LM. at 95 (emphasis added).
169 See Doha Declaration, ipranote 97.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss1/6

20

Kehl: Trips Article 31(b) and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

2002]

TRIPS ARTICLE 31(B) AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC

163

in international law." ' Therefore looking solely at the terms of Article 31(b) is
inadequate in this case. In deciding whether the terms "national emergency" can
be interpreted to include a public health emergency, and more specifically the
HIV/AIDS crisis, one must consider all of the terms of TRIPS Article 31, in light
of the object and purpose of the Agreement, and determine whether it accommodates this particular public health objective. The following sections will reveal the
difficulties in concluding that TRIPS Article 31(b) can be used to address the
HIV/AIDS public health emergency.
D. TRIPS ARTICLES 7 AND 8.1

In finding the object and purpose of Article 31's "national emergency
provision," a compulsory licensing dispute could involve discussion of TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8.1.
TRIPS Article 7 states the "Objectives" of the Agreement:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.'

TRIPS Article 8 states the "Principles" of the Agreement. Article 8.1 provides:
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement."
In the Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products dispute (Canada
dispute), a WTO panel addressed the consistency of certain Canadian patent
legislation with the TRIPS Agreement.'73 One disputed piece of legislation was

170
7

Schloemann & Ohihoff, supra note 154, at 445.
TRIPS, spra note 1, 33 I.L.M. at 86-87.

172

Id at 87.

173

Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DSI14/R (Mar. 17, 2000)
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the "regulatory review exception," '74 which allowed use of a patented product for
the development and submission of information required by Canadian law.
Unlike compulsory licensing under TRIPS Article 31, the "regulatory review
exception" falls under TRIPS Article 30.17' Both Article 30 and 31, however,
"permit exceptions to patent rights subject to certain mandatory conditions."176
In assessing the object and purpose of Article 30, the panel compared the
views of Canada and the European Communities regarding Articles 7 and 8.1.
According to Canada, Article 7 makes the "balance between the intellectual
property rights created by the Agreement and other important socio-economic
policies of WTO Member governments" one of the TRIPS Agreement's key
goals. 7 Furthermore, "Article 8 elaborates the socio-economic policies in
question, with particular attention to health and nutritional policies."' 78 The
European Communities, in comparison, viewed Articles 7 and 8 as "statements
that describe the balancing of goals that79had already taken place in negotiating the
final texts of the TRIPS Agreement.'
Essentially, the panel found that the mere presence of Article 30 shows a
recognition that the TRIPS Agreement's definition of patent rights would need
to be adjusted, but Article 30's limited conditions "testify strongly that the
negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article 30 to bring about what would
be equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement.""
Given that TRIPS Articles 30 and 31 both permit exceptions to patent rights,
a similar analysis could be given to TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.1 in a HIV/AIDSrelated compulsory licensing dispute. They will therefore be considered in
determining the object and purpose of Article 31. Developing countries,

[hereinafter Canada Dispute].
174Canadian Patent Act, section 55.2(1) provides:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or
sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development

and submission of information required under any law of Canada, aprovince or
acountry other than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or
sale of any product.

E.g., id at 2.1; see 4w id at 7.2.
17 Canada Dispute, supra note 173, at 7.39. TRIPS Article 30, Exceptions to Rights Conferred,
provides: "Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,

provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with anormal exploitation of the patent
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties." TRIPS, spra note 1, 33 LLM.at 95.
176Canada Dispute, stra note 173, at 7.91.

Id at 7.24.

17
178 Id

279Id at 7.25.
'80
Id at 7.26.
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however, are unlikely to find that these provisions unequivocally support
involuntary licenses in a public health emergency context.
According to the plain terms of Article 8.1, public health measures adopted by
Members must be "consistent with the provisions of this Agreement" (such as
TRIPS Article 27.1 discussed below) and "necessary" to protect public health. 8'
A panel will find that TRIPS Article 31(b) public health emergency legislation is
not consistent with TRIPS Article 27.1, that it is not "necessary" under Article
8.1, and that when the other terms of Article 31 are applied in the HIV/AIDS
context, it upsets the basic balance of the Agreement.
E. TRIPS ARTICLE 27.1

In the Canada dispute, though the debate revolved in part around whether
TRIPS Article 30 was subject to TRIPS Article 27.1, the panel also briefly
8 2
discussed TRIPS Article 31 and the relationship between these two provisions.
The panel report noted the "acknowledged fact that the Article 31 exception for
compulsory licenses and government use is understood to be subject to the nondiscrimination rule of 27.1.,,183 TRIPS Article 27.1 provides in part, "patents shall
be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced."'"
Though the panel found TRIPS Article 30, like TRIPS Article 31, was subject
to the non-discrimination requirement of TRIPS Article 27.1,185 it did not find the
evidence sufficient to prove Canada's "regulatory review exception" (section
55.2(1)) was discriminatory." The panel deferred from giving a precise definition
of discrimination, but concluded in this particular dispute:
It was not proved that the legal scope of Section 55.2(1) was limited
to pharmaceutical products, as would normally be required to raise
a claim of dejmre discrimination. Likewise, it was not proved that
the adverse effects of Section 55.2(1) were limited to the pharmaceutical industry, or that the objective indications of purpose
demonstrated a purpose to impose disadvantages on pharmaceutical
patents in particular, as is often required to raise a claim of de facto

,81 Id at 4.30(a).
182 Id at 7.90-7.91.
Canada Dispute, s'pranote 173, at 7.91.
TRIPS, supra note 1, 33 I.LM. at 93-94.
183 Canada Dispute, supra note 173, at 7.93.
186 Id at 7.105. See supra note 174 for the text of section 55.2(1).
'a

'u

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6

J. IfNlELL PROP.L

[Vol. 10:143

discrimination. Having found that the record did not raise any of
these basic elements of a discrimination claim, the Panel was able
to find that Section 55.2(1) is not inconsistent with Canada's
obligations under Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 87
In the Canada dispute, the legislation itself did not mention pharmaceuticals. It
used the language, "any product."'" Canada even cited a court decision in which
a producer of a medical device invoked section 55.2(1).19
If a developing nation has legislation that attempts to utilize the TRIPS Article
31(b) "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency"",
exception in a public health !emergency context such as HIV/AIDS, and its
primary purpose is to ease the patent protection on certain pharmaceuticals, there
could be an Article 27.1 discrimination problem. Though the Canada panel did
not give a precise definition of the term "discriminatory," a WTO panel might
find the language in the above Canada panel's conclusion persuasive. A
developing nation would be unlikely to surpass challenges that the legal scope of
such legislation is not limited to pharmaceuticals, and that adverse effects are not
limited to the pharmaceutical industry. A panel would find the legislation
discriminatory, and thus inconsistent with TRIPS Article 27.1.
In addition, though the Canada panel indicated at one point in its report that
"Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may
exist only in certain product areas,"'. it offered no further explanation of "bona
fide." There may be room for debate in the future over what exceptions a panel
will consider to be bona fide under TRIPS Article 27.1. Nonetheless, even if a
panel finds TRIPS Article 31(b) public health emergency legislation to be
"consistent with the terms" of Article 27.1, it is not likely to find such legislation
"necessary" within the meaning of TRIPS Article 8.1.
F. GATT ARTICLE XX

A WTO panel hearing the TRIPS compulsory licensing dispute could consider
a prior panel's analysis of the term "necessary" in the GATT Article XX
exceptions.' 92 GATT, like TRIPS, is committed to the goal of liberal trade."'

Id at 2.1.
Id at 7.97.
t TRIPS, stpra note 1,33 I.LM. at 95.
18

"s

1'' Canada Dispute, nrm note 173, at 7.92.

See Schloemann & Ohlhoff, jspra note 154, at 431 n.38; but see Correa, supra note 149, at 11
(arguing that it is "doubtful whether GATTr Article XX(b) would apply in the TRIPS context").
193 Kennedy, sipranote 101, at 38.
192
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GATT, however, also includes exceptions that can be invoked to restrict certain
imports."' GATr Article XX provides in part: "nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures: ... (b) necessag' to protect human, animal or plant life or healt...
In Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes
(Thai Cigarettes), a 1990 GAIT panel defined the term "necessary" in GATT
Article XX(b).' 96
The United States claimed Thailand's imposition of import restrictions on
tobacco was inconsistent with GATT Article XI.' 91 Thailand, however, claimed
it was trying to protect its public from the harmful ingredients in imported
tobacco'98 and reduce the consumption of cigarettes,'" thus falling within the
scope of the Article XX(b) exception.
The panel agreed the issue fell within the scope of Article XX(b), and noted
that it "clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over
trade liberalization; [H]owever, for a measure to be covered by Article XX(b) it
had to be 'necessary.' " The panel determined that import restrictions "could
be considered to be 'necessary' in terms of Artide XX(b) only if there were no
alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent
with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its
health policy objectives."' "il The panel concluded there were other measures
consistent with GATT available to Thailand to achieve this health policy goal, and
therefore found that the import restrictions were not necessary within the
meaning of Article XX(b). 2
"This interpretation of 'necessary,' " according to one writer, "restates the
minimum derogation principle. In other words, any measure taken under one of
the Article XX exceptions must be the least trade restrictive measure available."' 2°
In a more recent report, European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, the Appellate Body discussed the
necessity of a French measure that prohibits the manufacturing, importing, etc.
1%Id

,95 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b), 61 Stat. A-11, A-60, 55
U.N.T.S. 194,262 (emphasis added) [hereinafter GATT].
1' Thailand Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1989-1990), DS10/R-375/200 (Oct. 5,1990) [hereinafter Thai

Cigarettes].
197 Id

at 202.

'98 Id at 223.

Id at 223-24.
Id at 223.
2o Thai Cigarettes, supra note 196, at 223.
202 Id at 225-26.
203 Kennedy, spranote 101, at 40.
'9
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of products containing asbestos fibers.' The Appellate Body said the object of
the measure is the "preservation of human life and health through the elimination,
or reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by
asbestos fibres."" s It emphasized the importance of this objective and even
noted that the more important the value pursued, the easier it would be to see the
necessity in measures designed to achieve such objectives.'
The Appellate Body, however, discussed and did not reject the Thai Cigarettes
interpretation of "necessary." 7 In addition, it still asked if "there is an alternative
measure that would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of
trade....,,"i8
France's chosen level of health protection was a "halt in the spread
of asbestos-related health risks."' The "controlled use" alternative proposed by
Canada, according to the Appellate Body, was not reasonable because it "would
involve the continuation of the very risk the Decree seeks to halt" 2"' Thus, the
French restriction was "necessary" under Article XX(b). n
TRIPS Article 31, like GATT Article XX, removes in particular instances a
Member state from its obligations under other portions of the Agreement. And
though unlike GATT Article XX, TRIPS Article 31 itself does not include the
term "necessary, 2 1 2 TRIPS Article 8.1 (discussed above) does include such
language in reference to public health measures.213 If a WTO panel decides to use
similar reasoning as it did in Thai Cigarettes, it might find that for a public health
measure to be covered by TRIPS Article 31(b), it must also be necessary,
according to the "principles" addressed in TRIPS Article 8.1.
Panel members who believe that the strongest intellectual property protection
promotes free trade will probably not consider compulsory licensing legislation
that makes the HIV/AIDS crisis a "national emergency or other circumstance[ ]
of extreme urgency," 2 4 thus waiving the TRIPS Article 31(b) requirement, to be
the least trade restrictive measure available. There will be arguments from the
developed world that negotiating lower medication prices, donating medication,

204European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,

WT/DS135/AB/R at 164-175 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos Dispute].
2
Id at 172.
M06

Id

m Id at 170.
2o8
Id at 172.
' EC-Asbestos Dispute, spra note 204, at 173.
210 Id at 174.
211 Id at 175.
212TRIPS, srpra note 1, 33 I.LM. at 95.
213 Id at 87.
214 Id at 95.
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and further developing infrastructure in the most affected nations are alternatives

to relaxing intellectual property rights.
In addition, though the Appellate Body report in the EC-Asbestos Dispute
appears to reflect a more flexible approach to dealing with measures used to
preserve human life and health, the factual circumstances in a HIV/AIDS
compulsory licensing dispute will be significantly different. The alternatives
mentioned above cannot be said to continue a risk a developing nation seeks to
halt. Though they may not be as quick or effective, they do and will help
developing nations deal with the epidemic, and are thus reasonable alternatives
and less restrictive of trade than compulsory licenses under the national
emergency exception. Therefore, a panel is likely to conclude that public health
emergency legislation is not "necessary" within the meaning of TRIPS Article 8.1,
and thus is not covered by TRIPS Article 31(b).
G. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN TRIPS ARTICLE

31

The national emergency provision only waives one requirement of
TRIPS-that before a compulsory license is issued, the proposed user must first
try to obtain a voluntary license from the right holder. " s' The other provisions of
TRIPS Article 31 must still be met. Difficulties in implementing these measures
or the potential for them to be used for extended periods of time may further
persuade a panel that TRIPS Article 31 generally does not encompass public
health emergencies.
According to TRIPS Article 31(c), the scope and duration of use is limited to
the purpose for which it was authorized, and that authorization, according to
TRIPS Article 3 1 (g), is liable to be terminated2 1"when
the circumstances which led
6
to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.2

If applied in the context of a HIV/AIDS public health emergency, this
language could be interpreted to mean that as long as the HIV/AIDS crisis exists
or is likely to recur, countries may use compulsory licenses without first
attempting to gain voluntary approval from patent holders. Such an interpretation has the potential to make a twenty-year monopoly on a pharmaceutical
worthless in developing nations hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
considering it will likely take more than twenty years to address the problem. In
addition to losing profits in countries manufacturing the drugs under Article
31(b), the patent holder could lose profits in countries lacking the infrastructure
to manufacture the drugs, which import the drugs from those manufacturing
countries. TRIPS Article 31() limits this practice to some extent, stating that
215 Id at 95.
216 Id at 95; see spra note 168 and accompanying text.
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compulsory licenses must be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market of the Member authorizing such use,"2 7 but the total loss of profit from
widespread use of such measures could be significant in the eyes of patent
8
21

holders.

Finally, according to TRIPS Article 31(h), "the right holder shall be paid
adequate remuneration. ' 21 9 One writer has noted that to determine compensation, "authorities may require the patent holder to disclose product-specific R&D
investments, revenues and other relevant economic data, while ensuring adequate
protection of any confidential commercial data."' Though developing countries
may be willing to compensate pharmaceutical companies, these companies may
be less than willing to turn over the information necessary to come up with
compensation figures.
A powerful argument of the industry in the compulsory licensing debate is that
in order to encourage innovation and development, it is imperative that
companies retrieve research and development costs through exclusive patent
ownership.2' High prices and twenty-year monopolies recover these costs. Many
companies, however, have substantial profit margins even when research and
development costs are taken into account (with some companies making annual
profits two to three times the amounts they put into research and
development).' In addition, some of the research used in developing these drugs
has been publicly funded."' There are many reasons for keeping commercial data
on individual drugs confidential, but one of them is that as long as it is kept
confidential, the general public's backing for the strongest intellectual property
protection remains intact. Even if a company is assured that confidential
commercial data will be protected, it is still possible that the public will draw

TRIPS, supra note 1, 33 I.LM. at 95; see smupra note 168 and accompanying text
Proponents of the strongest intellectual property protection could argue that like parallel
imports, compulsory licensing schemes impact profits in such a way that it becomes difficult for the
company to recoup research and development costs, thus in the end harming those nations in
greatest need of innovative medicines. See A. Bryan Baer, Price Contros Throgh th Back Door The
217
218

ParalkiIortation ofPharmaradcai, 9J. INTELL PRop.L 109,134-35 (2001) (discussing the negative
consequences of parallel imports).
219 TRIPS, supra note 1, 33 I.LM. at 95; see supra note 168 and accompanying text
2m Correa, spra note 149, at 51.
221 See id at 43.
2 For details on profits and revenues allocated to research and development, marketing, etc.,
see Families USA, Profitingfnmm Pain: Where PecriptionDrmg Dollars Go, Families USA Foundation,
availabk at http://www. familiesusa.org/PPreport.pdf (July 2002).
2 For details on government involvement in research and development, see Consumer Project
on Technology, AddtionalNote on Govenment Rok in the Development of HIV/AIDS Drugs, availabk
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/gov-role.html (last modified Feb. 23, 2000).
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negative inferences from what constitutes "adequate" compensation on a
particular drug.
Because of these implementation difficulties, a panel may find Article 31
cannot realistically accommodate public health emergencies such as the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Like the GAIT panel's analysis of the limitations of
TRIPS Article 30 in the Canada case, a WTO panel may find that Article 31's
limited conditions also "testify strongly" that negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement did not intend Article 31 "to bring about what would be equivalent to a
renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement." ' 4 The risk that patents will
be of less value in certain countries, and that compensation will be too difficult,
may give a panel cause to believe that such an application of TRIPS Article 31 is
upsetting the basic balance of the agreement, and is therefore unacceptable.
IV. CONCLUSION

A panel in the WTO as it exists today will likely find: that TRIPS Article 31(b)
legislation directed at pharmaceuticals is discriminatory, and therefore inconsistent
with TRIPS Article 27.1; that because there are less restrictive trade measures
available to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it is not "necessary" under TRIPS
Article 8.1; and that when the other terms of Article 31 are applied in the
HIV/AIDS context, it upsets the basic balance of the Agreement-and thus
conclude that TRIPS Article 31 (b) does not encompass public health emergencies
such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Current political influences on the WTO and the WTO texts as they exist
primarily promote the liberalization of trade. Panels and the Appellate Body issue
reports and decisions that impact other important social policy goals. People who
are dissatisfied with the current WTO, particularly in the context of HIV/AIDS,
should work towards making the right to health a legal and enforceable human
right in the international community, getting developing nations better WTO legal
assistance and an effective enforcement mechanism,n s and influencing WTO
Members to amend the TRIPS Agreement to accommodate public health
objectives aimed at addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Accomplishing these
goals could bring a more suitable balance of social policy objectives into the WTO
dispute settlement process.
JOHANNA KIEHL

22' See sfra
22

note 180 and accompanying text.

Van der Borght, nepra note 106, at 1226.
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